Pre-positioning inventory and service outsourcing of relief material supply chain by Yao, Xin. et al.
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Production 
Research on 19 July 2018, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/00207543.2018.1495853. 
 1 
Pre-positioning inventory and service outsourcing of 
relief material supply chain 
 
Xin Yaoab, Ruting Huanga, Malin Song ∗, c, Nishikant Mishrad 
aChina Center for Energy Economics Research, School of Economics, Xiamen 
University, Xiamen, China; 
bCollaborative Innovation Center for Energy Economics and Energy Policy, Xiamen 
University, Xiamen, China; 
cSchool of Statistics and Applied Mathematics, Anhui University of Finance and 
Economics, Bengbu, China; 
dHull Business School, University of Hull, UK. 
 
Abstract: Service outsourcing is very common in a commercial supply chain, and 
in humanitarian relief area the transportation service is usually outsourced. To practice 
relief supply more effectively, it seems essential to enlarge outsourcing from shipping 
to more areas, and private enterprises could play a vital role. This paper examines the 
optimal pre-disaster order quantity of a certain relief commodity, based on a two-stage 
coordinated approach. Our findings show that the delay cost, shortage penalty cost, 
risk of supply shortage, salvage value, expected perishable rate, unit inventory cost 
and reactive price have significant impacts on the optimal amount of propositioned 
inventory. Moreover, the outsourcing strategies differ by types of relief commodities. 
For perishable supplies, proactive or reactive outsourcing would improve the benefits 
of buyer and supplier simultaneously. As for imperishable supplies, it is better to 
combine proactive insourcing approach and reactive outsourcing strategy. In view of 
some supplies whose monitoring cost is high, the insourcing approach is much better 
than outsourcing approach. 
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1. Introduction  
Disasters, natural or man-made, have occurred more frequently in recent years, as 
well as the casualties (Nagurney et al. 2011; Day 2014). As shown in Fig. 1, about 18 
thousand people were killed in the top 10 natural disaster by number of deaths in 2015 
(UNISDR 2016). In addition, more than 200 million people are affected by natural 
disasters annually (Duran et al. 2011) and survival of the victims relies much on the 
humanitarian assistance provided by government or not-for-profit organizations 
(NPOs), such as Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Red Cross 
(Kunz et al. 2014).  
 
Figure 1. The top 10 natural disasters by number of deaths in 2015 
Humanitarian operations management (HOM) refers to those operations to help 
individuals deal with disasters or human sufferings (Wang et al. 2015). The objective 
of relief supply is to provide humanitarian assistance to areas affected by 
large-emergencies, so as to minimize suffering or even death (Beamon and Balcik 
2008; Balcik and Beamon 2008). In humanitarian actions, shortages or delivery delays 
may cause serious losses, and therefore efficient and effective logistics is a key factor 
(Beamon and Balcik 2008; Da Cosat et al. 2012; Naor et al. 2017). Global 
environmental problems have become more serious (Chavan 2017). Occurrence of 
various disasters is expected to increase by times in the next fifty years, due to 
environmental degradation and other factors (Thomas and Kopczak 2005). Thus, 
relief material supply chain management has received increased interest and focus 
(Ransikarbum and Mason 2014; Manopiniwes and Irohara 2016).  
The responses against a disaster or disruption can be typically divided into four 
8831
3275
2248
1229
627 410 325 293 280 2780
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
Earthquake
(Nepal)
Heat wave
(France)
Heat wave
(India )
Heat wave
(Pakistan)
Landslide
(Guatemala)
Heat wave
(Belgium)
Flood
(India)
Flood
(India)
Earthquake
(Pakistan)
Flood
(Malawi)
number of deaths
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Production 
Research on 19 July 2018, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/00207543.2018.1495853. 
 3 
phases: mitigation, preparation, immediate response and reconstruction (Lodree et al. 
2012, Iakovou et al. 2014; Ivanov et al. 2014). An integrated approach to manage 
disasters comprises both proactive decisions and reactive approaches (Lin et al. 2008). 
Proactive decisions provide certain protections before a disaster occurs and reactive 
approach mainly focuses on adjusting supply chain processes in the presence of 
unexpected events (Ivanov et al. 2016; Dolgui et al. 2017).  
Due to uncertainty, all needed relief supplies should be stored in advance to meet 
an emergency (Yadavalli 2015). Based on their characteristics, the critical items can 
be divided into two categories, non-perishable commodities (i.e., tent, clothing, 
blanket, non-perishable food, etc.) and perishable products, for instance, blood 
products, packed milk, medical commodities, etc. (Rezaei-Malek et al. 2016). 
Governments or NPOs are the purchasers of disaster reliefs, and large retailers such as 
Wal-Mart or Home Depot are the major suppliers. Governments or NPOs purchase 
critical relief materials from big retailers, store in advance and distribute them to the 
victims. FEMA and other government agencies were heavily criticized by the press 
and scholars for their failures in the 2005 Hurricane Katrina, while Wal-Mart and 
other private retailers were widely praised for being effective in providing disaster 
reliefs (Holguín-Veras 2007; Horwitz 2009). Governments and NPOs are well 
experienced in humanitarian relief rather than logistic management while large 
retailers are good at dealing with daily logistics problems.  
We live in an age of outsourcing (Grossman and Helpman 2005). Service 
outsourcing is very common in a commercial supply chain. As for humanitarian relief, 
the transportation service has usually been outsourced. Large retailers, with enough 
inventory capacity and high turnover rate, are more expertized than governments and 
NPOs in terms of logistic management. Relief and commercial supply chain have 
some similarities, while there exist more differences (Kovács and Spens 2007; Wang 
et al. 2015). The differences between them may introduce some new issues worth of 
studying (Wang et al. 2015). The one that we want to analyze focuses on outsourcing 
strategy in relief material supply chain. 
Relief material management is confronted with a dilemma (Wang et al. 2014). In 
proactive decisions, the prepositioned inventory can be obtained immediately after 
disaster strikes, with a low price. While, a large scale of pre-disaster inventory can be 
risky and costly since the demand is uncertain and the assets may be underutilized 
(Beamon and Kotleba 2006). Real-time response can reduce the loss caused by 
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uncertainty, while its shortcoming is the possible unavailability and high unit cost 
(Chakravarty 2014; Wang et al. 2014). In practice, purchasers often keep a certain 
amount of relief supplies in advance and trigger the real-time procurement once a 
disaster occurs (Chakravarty 2014).  
Taking China for example, disasters happen frequently in recent years and China 
proposed to build a more complete relief material reserve network. Chinese 
government and NPOs play a leading role in disaster relief inventory. Some problems, 
however, still remain, such as poor way of inventory, limited variety and so on. This 
paper tries to solve this problem by introducing outsourcing into relief material supply 
chain. To enlarge outsourcing from shipping to more areas may contribute to more 
efficient relief material management, and private enterprises should play a vital role 
(Wang et al. 2016). 
Therefore, we analyze the optimal pre-disaster inventory of certain relief 
commodities and compare the social efficiency between the insourcing and 
outsourcing approaches. The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
presents a review of related literature. Section 3 describes the model and section 4 
provides an analysis on a benchmarking case with insourcing approach. In section 5, 
the outsourcing approach is compared. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature review 
In modern organizations, logistics management involves decision making for the 
complete distribution of goods or services, with a view to minimize cost and 
maximize efficiency. It is common for a company to outsource the function and buy 
logistics service in today’s business environment (Lieb and Randall 1997; Razzaque 
and Sheng 1998). Third party logistics is to get the right products to right places with 
right prices under the help of outsiders (Wei 2000). Through outsourcing other 
activities, enterprises can improve logistic efficiency, concentrate on their 
competencies and be more competitive. During recent decades, logistics outsourcing 
has been one of the top management agenda (Gadde and Hulthén, 2009) and has been 
widely studied in the field of commercial supply chain (Hong et al. 2004; Bottani and 
Rizzi 2006; Yang et al. 2016; König and Spinler 2016; Hansen et al. 2016). Sohail and 
Sohal (2003) examine the use of third party logistics in Malaysia and find that most of 
the users have largely seen positive development within organizations. Hsiao et al. 
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(2010) examine whether different logistics outsourcing activities leads to differences 
in logistic service performance. They find that the relationship between levels of 
outsourcing, performance and supply chain characteristic is complex.  
Humanitarian relief chain shares some similar aspects with commercial supply 
chain, while some key areas are different. These features include the uncertain and 
dynamic environment and unique management principles in humanitarian relief chain 
operation (Day and Melnyk 2012). Note that, consumers of relief supplies are victims 
affected by large-emergencies and they are not traditional consumers. However, the 
frequency and scale of disasters tend to increase, more effective disaster relief 
services are needed.  
Outsourcing in the field of humanitarian supply chain has also attracted some 
attention. Cottam et al. (2004) study the role of trucks outsourcing in the famine in 
Ethiopia in 2000 and find that outsourcing has both advantages and disadvantages. 
Carbonnier (2006) discusses the various parties involved in armed conflicts, 
especially those of private enterprises, and highlights that it is essential to better grasp 
the potential opportunities and risk related to privatization and outsourcing so as to 
provide effective assistance. In case of critical needs (e.g. medicine, food, water, 
vaccines etc.), Anna Nagurney et al. (2011) consider the design of supply chain 
networks and investigate whether the product should be produced in-house or be 
outsourced. Wang and Huang (2014) compare three disaster relief approaches which 
include traditional relief approach, transportation service outsourcing approach and 
inventory and transportation service outsourcing approach. They find that the 
efficiency of a relief supply chain could be improved by the logistic service 
outsourcing. Gil and Mcneil (2015) study the levels of outsourcing among the actors 
of the humanitarian response system to aid those, which are influenced by natural 
disasters or the armed conflict in Colombia. Wang et al. (2016) classify a relief supply 
chain into four types and the critical relief commodities into two categories as 
imperishable and perishable. They advocate that different strategies should be taken as 
the situation differs.  
Relief material management is an important part of relief supply chain and has 
attracted much attention recently (Yang et al. 2014). For example, Barbarosoǧlu and 
Arda (2004) propose a two-stage stochastic programming model to solve the response 
problem of distribution of vital first-aid commodities. Cruzcantillo and Saleh (2014) 
build a system dynamic model for the forecasting, prioritization and distribution of 
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critical relief supplies in case of a hurricane event. Some scholars have also 
introduced the option contract mechanism into the relief material management. Liang 
et al. (2012) apply the supply chain management mothed into relief material 
management to build an option pricing model. Wang et al. (2015) find that an option 
contract is superior to instant-purchasing. To the best of our knowledge, the existing 
literature focused on outsourcing in relief material supply chain is fairly inadequate. 
Based on Wang et al. (2016), a two-stage coordinated approach model is built. 
There are some differences in these two papers. Firstly, what we want to discuss is the 
optimal prepositioned quantity of a certain good and the factors influencing the 
optimal quantity. In real disaster relief supply, it always has to combine both proactive 
decisions and real-time approach (Chakravarty, 2011; Wang et al. 2016). Thus, this 
paper considers the optimal stock quantity in a two-stage approach model which 
includes ex ante inventory and real-time acquisition. Moreover, the perishable rate 
may be a stochastic variable instead of being a constant, which depends on humidity 
and other effects. Finally, outsourcing has its perils and merits at the same. If the 
quality of some essential items is difficult to be supervised, the monitoring cost would 
be high. The relief material supply chain would be impacted by this inevitably. Taking 
different levels of monitoring cost into consideration, different response methods are 
analyzed to cope with different cases. 
3. Model description 
In this paper, we consider two stages for disaster relief, proactive decisions and 
real-time response after the disaster. In the first stage, the proactive inventory amount 
iQ  of good i  is decided before disasters. And in the second stage, after the disaster 
has struck the relief provider should decide the optimal amount iq  of good i  which 
is delivered to the affected location after demand realization. The demand for good i  
is a stochastic variable X ( )0x ≥ . The probability density and cumulative distribution 
functions are ( )f x  and ( )F x  respectively. However, reactive approach involves 
supply risk and we assume that the probability of demand being satisfied is 
( )к 0 к 1≤ ≤ . In other words, the risk of supply shortage is 1 к−  . As it is known, the 
supply shortage may lead to serious suffering and even death. Therefore the unit 
shortage penalty cost is defined as id . For simplicity and analytical tractability, we 
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assume that iq  equals to ( )max ,0ix Q− . Similar assumptions can be found in Wang 
et al. (2015). After the disaster has struck, the prepositioned inventory iQ  can be 
available as soon as possible while it takes some time for additional supplies iq  to be 
delivered. Delays in receiving supplies will cause some social cost (Chakravarty 
2014). Thus we assume that the social value for unit of iQ  is 0iv  and the unit value 
attained from iq  is expressed as 1iv , where 0iv  is larger than 1iv . In addition, we 
assume that the social value for unit of good i  is larger than the cost. 
The wholesale price for iQ  is assumed as iw  and the retail price for iq  is ip , 
the cost of prepositioned relief supplies is pic , the unit cost for real-time relief 
supplies is ric  and salvage value of unused supplies is is . The relationship between 
them is expressed as r pi i i i ip w c c s> > > > . The unit inventory and distribution costs are 
denoted as iI  and it  respectively. Product i  perishes with ratio (0 1)ii ηη ≤ ≤ , 
which is assumed to be a stochastic variable. The probability density and cumulative 
distribution functions are ( )ig η  and ( )iG η  respectively. 
The relief providers can choose between insourcing and outsourcing approaches. 
When outsourcing, the buyers can also choose between proactive decision and 
real-time response. When proactive outsourcing approach is taken, we assume that the 
relief providers pay outiw  for one unit of good i  where the relief material is stored 
and distributed by the third-party private enterprises. When reactive outsourcing 
strategy is taken, it is assumed that good i  is distributed by the third-party and the 
relief provider pay outip  for one unit after a disaster has struck. The unit inventory 
and shipping cost for the private enterprises are outiI  and outit  respectively, and the 
unit value attained from iq  is expressed as 2iv . Since the private enterprises has 
more logistic expertise than the government or NGOs, we assume that 1 2 0i i iv v v< < , 
out
i iI I< , and outi it t< . Besides, to ensure the efficiency of outsourcing, there is some 
monitoring cost which is defined as iβ . 
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4. Basic model 
4.1 A basic model with insourcing approach 
In this scenario, the government or NGOs purchase certain amount of relief materials 
from suppliers and provide inventory and distribution themselves. In the first stage, 
the purchaser decides the optimal amount iQ  of item i  to be stored in the 
warehouse and in the second stage triggers the real-time response after a disaster 
strikes. As mentioned above, in the second stage all demand is satisfied with the 
probability κ  and we have max( ,0)i iq x Q= − . Before the disaster, purchaser has 
sufficient time to bargain with suppliers and thus can purchase good i  with a 
relatively low unit price, which is iw . Once real-time procurement triggers, the price 
the purchaser pays for one unit of item i  is the retail price ip . As for the supplier, 
with sufficient time, the cost of the prepositioned relief supplies is pic  and the cost 
for real-time relief supplies is ric . 
Thus the buyer’s expected profit is expressed as follows. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 1max [ min , max ,0 1 max ,0
max ,0 max ,0 ]
i
i i i i i iQ
i i i i i i i i i i i
E E v x Q кv x Q к d x Q
s Q x w t I w Q к p t x Q
π
η
= + − − − −
+ − − + + + − + −
 (1) 
Where the first two terms are the expected values of victims, the third term is the 
social cost for shortage penalty, the fourth term is the expected value from salvaging 
unused materials, the fifth term is cost of proactive inventory and the sixth term is the 
expected cost for real-time deliveries. The unit cost for iQ  is [ ]( )i i i i iw t I w E η+ + + , 
where iw  is the price paid to the supplier, it  is shipping cost, iI  is inventory cost 
and ( )i iw E η  is expected cost caused by deterioration. Without shortage, the unit cost 
for iq  is expressed as ( )i ip t+ . 
After some transformation, we can get 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) [ ] ( ){ }
0 1 1
0
0 1
max π 1 1
1 ( )
i
i
Q
i i i i i i i i i iQ
i i i i i i i i i i i
E v кv к d s к p t F x dx кv к d к p t E x
v кv к d w t I w к p t QE η
   = − + − − + − + + − − − +   
+ − + − − + + + + +
∫  (2) 
The goal of the purchaser is to maximize the expected social value by deciding 
the optimal amount of iQ . The first order condition is: 
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( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) [ ] ( ){ }
0 1
0 1
1
1 0
+
( )
i
i i i i i i i
i
i i i i i i i i i i
E Q
v кv к d s к p F Q
Q
v кv к d w t I w
t
к p tE
π
η
 ∂    = − + − − + − ∂
+ − + − − + + + + + =
 (3) 
The second order derivative of ( )iE Qπ    with respective to iQ  is expressed as 
follows: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
0 1
2 1
i
i i i i i i i
i
E Q
v кv к d s к p t f Q
Q
π ∂    = − + − − + − + ∂
 (4) 
Based on the assumption, we have ( ) ( )0 1[ 1 ] 0i i i i i iv кv к d s к p t− − + − − + + < . And we 
can obtain ( )
2
2 0
i
i
E Q
Q
π ∂   <
∂
. The first-order condition works. Denote 
( )0 1 1i i i iv кv к dγ = − + − , which can represent the cost of delay and shortage to a certain 
degree. The optimal stock quantity *iQ  is given as: 
* 1 i r p
i
i r i
к
Q F
к s
γ θ θ
γ θ
− + − =  + − 
 (5) 
Where ( )p i i i i iw t I Ewθ η= + + +  and r i ip tθ = + . 
Proposition 1. When and only when the difference between the prepositioned cost and the 
real-time cost is lower than the expected delay and shortage cost, the purchasers would 
choose to store relief supplies in advance, to enable a quick response to disasters; otherwise, 
it is much better to take reactive approach. 
*
1
0 if
 if 
p r i
i r pi
p r i
i r i
к
кQ
F к
к s
θ θ γ
γ θ θ
θ θ γ
γ θ
−
− ≥
+ − 
− < +

−
=





 
Since this paper tries to study the optimal stock quantity of a certain relief commodity 
ahead of time and compare the social efficiency with and without outsourcing, we 
assume p r iкθ θ γ− < . The expected social value is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) [ ] ( ){ }
*
* 0 1 1
0
0 1 *
V 1 1
1 ( )
iQ
i i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i i i i
Q v кv к d s к p t F x dx кv к d к p t E x
v кv к d w t I w к t QE pη
   = − + − − + − + + − − − +   
+ − + − − + + + + +
∫  (6) 
Moreover, the expected profit of the supplier can be expressed as follows: 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
*
* *
* *
0
max ,
)]
0
[ ](i
s p r
i i i i i i
Qp r
i i i i i i
E w c Q x Q p c
w c Q E x F x dx Q p c
π κ
κ
 = − + − − 
== − + + − −∫
 (7) 
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4.2 Sensitivity to critical ratio 
4.2.1 Sensitivity to changes in 1iv  
Proposition 2. The higher delay cost of good i  is, the more the purchaser would store in 
advance. 
Proof: The numerator of the derivative of *iQ  with respect to 1iv  is: 
( )
( )
( )2*
1 p i
i i r i
к s
f Q к s
θ
γ θ
−
− ×
+ −
 (8) 
We know that ( )* 0if Q >  and 0p isθ − > . According to the assumption, 
expression (8) will always be negative. As 1iv  decreases, the prepositioned amount of 
good i  will increase. Smaller 1iv  means that the value loss caused by delay is 
higher.  
4.2.2 Sensitivity to changes in shortage penalty cost ( id ) 
Proposition 3. The higher the shortage penalty cost is, the more the prepositioned inventory 
would be. 
Proof: The numerator of the derivative of *iQ  with respect to id  is: 
( )
( )( )
( )2*
11 p i
i i r i
к s
f Q к s
θ
γ θ
− −
×
+ −
 (9) 
Since ( )*if Q , 1 к−  and 0p isθ − >  are always positive, expression (9) is 
positive. As id  increases, the prepositioned inventory will also increase. 
4.2.3 Sensitivity to changes in the risk of supply shortage ( к ) 
Proposition 4. The larger к  is, the less the purchaser would store in advance. 
Proof: The numerator of the derivative of *iQ  with respect to к  is: 
( )
( )( )
( )
1
2*
1 p i i i r
i i r i
s v d
f Q к s
θ θ
γ θ
− − − +
×
+ −
 (10) 
As ( )* 0if Q > , 0p isθ − >  and 1i rv θ> , the sign of expression (10) is negative. If 
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к  increases, the prepositioned amount *iQ  will be reduced. 
4.2.4 Sensitivity to changes in salvage value ( is ) 
Proposition 5. The less salvage value of unused supplies is, the less amount of relief good i  
is stored. 
Proof: The numerator of the derivative of *iQ  with respect to is  is: 
( ) ( )2*
1 i r p
i i r i
к
f Q к s
γ θ θ
γ θ
+ −
×
+ −
 (11) 
As we know, ( )* 0if Q >  and p r iкθ θ γ− < . Based on these assumptions, the sign 
of expression (11) will always be nonnegative.  
4.2.5 Sensitivity to changes in expected perishable rate ( )( iE η ) 
Proposition 6. If one relief item is expected to be more perishable, the prepositioned 
inventory would be less. 
Proof: The numerator of the derivative of *iQ  with respect to )( iE η  is: 
( )*
1 i
i r ii
w
к sf Q γ θ
− ×
+ −
 (12) 
As we know, ( )* 0if Q > , 0iw > , and 0i r iк sγ θ+ − > . It is obvious that expression 
(12) will always be negative. As )( iE η  increases, *iQ  will decrease. 
4.26 Sensitivity to changes in the unit inventory cost ( iI ) 
Proposition 7. As iI  increases, the ex ante order quantity 
*
iQ  would be reduced. 
Proof: The numerator of the derivative of *iQ  with respect to iI  is: 
( )*
1 1
i r ii к sf Q γ θ
− ×
+ −
 (13) 
As ( )* 0if Q > , and 0i r iк sγ θ+ − > , based on these assumptions, expression (13) 
will always be negative. 
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4.2.6 Sensitivity to changes in the reactive price ( ip ) 
Proposition 8. As ip  increases, the proactive inventory will also increase. 
Proof: The numerator of the derivative of *iQ  with respect to ip  is: 
( )
( )
( )2*
1 p i
i i r i
к s
f Q к s
θ
γ θ
−
×
+ −
 (14) 
As ( )*if Q , к  and p isθ −  are positive, it easy to obtain that expression (14) 
will be positive. 
5. Outsourcing strategies 
In this section, we consider the situations of outsourcing. The buyer purchases for 
relief commodities. The inventory and distribution processes could be outsourced to 
the suppliers. Since an integrated disaster relief approach compromises both 
preparation and immediate response, the buyers can choose outsourcing options 
between proactive decision and reactive response. In the following part, we will 
analyze these two situations respectively. 
5.1 The scenario of proactive outsourcing response 
When the pre-disaster inventory is outsourced, government or NPOs pay outiw  for one 
unit of item i and the supplier provides the service of inventory and distribution. To 
ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of outsourcing, the cost of supervision should 
be paid, which is denoted as iβ . With outsourcing, the unit cost for government or 
NPOs is outi iw β+ . We assume outi iw w< , since the main goal of the third-party 
companies is to benefit from outsourcing. As for the private companies, the unit profit 
of iQ  is )( p out outi io i iutw c I t− + + , where outiI  and outit  are the inventory cost and 
shipping cost respectively. As the third party companies always have relatively high 
turnover rate, thus the cost of deterioration is not take into consideration. The 
purchaser’s expected value can be expressed as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 1max π [ min , max ,0 1 max ,0
max ,0 max ,0
p
i
p p p
i i i i i i
Q
p out p p
i i i i i i i i
E E v x Q кv x Q к d x Q
s Q x w Q к p t x Qβ
= + − − − −
+ − − + − + −
 (15) 
After some transformation, we can get 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
0 1 1
0
0 1
max π 1 1
1
p
i
p
i
Q
i i i i i i i i i i
Q
out p
i i i i i i i i
E v кv к d s к p t F x dx кv к d к p t E x
v кv к d w к p t Qβ
   = − + − − + − + + − − − +   
 + − + − − + + + 
∫  (16) 
Similarly, with the application of algebra, it is easy to obtain: 
( )* 1
0 ( )
 ( )
out
i i r i
outp
i r i ii out
i i r i
i r i
if w
к wQ
F if w к
к s
β κθ γ
γ θ β
β θ γ
γ θ
−
 + − ≥
  + − +=    + − <  + −  
 
As what mentioned above, we assume ( )outi i r iw кβ θ γ+ − < . The optimal stock 
quantity of good i  in this scenario is as follows: 
( )* 1 outi r i ip
i
i r i
к w
Q F
к s
γ θ β
γ θ
−
 + − +
 =
 + − 
 (17) 
The expected value of the purchaser is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
*
* 0 1 1
0
0 1 *
V 1 1 ( )
1
p
iQp
i i i i i i i i i i i
out p
i i i i i i i i
Q v кv к d s к p t F x dx кv к d к p t E x
v кv к d w к p t Qβ
   = − + − − + − + + − − − +   
 + − + − − + + + 
∫  (18) 
The expected profit of the supplier is: 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
*
* *
* *
0
m
](
ax 0
[ )
,
p
i
sp out out out p p p r
i i i i i i i i
Qout out out p p p r
i i i i i i i i
w t I c Q к x Q p c
w t I c Q к E x F x dx Q p c
π = − − − + − −
= − − − + + − −∫
 (19) 
Proposition 9. 
(1) The relationship between the optimal quantities *iQ  and 
*p
iQ  is as follows: 
* *
* *
( )
(
 
 )
p out
i i i i i i i i i
p out
i i i i i i i i i
ifQ Q w w t I w
Q Q w w t I w
E
if E
β η
β η
+ > + + +
+ ≤ +

≥ +
<
+



 
 (2) The profit of supplier and purchaser depends much on the expected perishable rate and 
monitoring cost. When the expected perishable rate )( iE η  is relatively large, the efficiency 
of a relief supply chain is improved in views of outsourcing. When the expected perishable 
rate is relatively low, a better strategy for government or NPOs is to taking the proactive 
insourcing approach. 
(3) When the monitoring cost iβ  is high, the benefit of government or NPOs cannot be 
improved simultaneously with outsourcing approach. While, with a relatively low iβ , 
outsourcing can improve the efficiency of relief supply chain. 
Proof. See Appendix A 
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5.2 The scenario of reactive outsourcing response. 
In this scenario, after a disaster strikes, the government or NPOs outsource the process 
of real-time response. The buyers purchase and the suppliers distribute the critical 
needs to the victims. The buyer pays the unit price of outip  for iq  and we assume 
that outi ip p> . As for the supplier, the unit cost is r outi ic t+ , where outit  is the 
distribution cost. The expected value of the purchaser is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 2max π [ min , max ,0 1 max ,0
max ,0 max ,0 ]
r
i
r r r
i i i i i i
Q
r r out r
i i i i i i i i i i i
E E v x Q кv x Q к d x Q
s Q x w t I w Q к p x Qη β
= + − − − −
+ − − + + + − + −
 (20) 
Through transforming, expression (20) can be given as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) [ ] ( ){ }
0 2 2
0
0 2
max π
(
1 1
1 )
r
i
r
i
Qout out
i i i i i i i i i i
Q
out r
i i i i i i i i i i i
E v кv к d s к p F x dx кv к d к p E x
v кv к d w t I w к QE p
β β
η β
   = − + − − + − + + − − − +   
+ − + − − + + + + +
∫  (21) 
With the application of algebra, we can obtain: 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
*
1
0 outp i i i
r out
i i i i p out
p i i iout
i i i i
к p
Q к p
F if к p
к
f
p
i
s
θ β δ
δ β θ
θ β δ
δ β
−
− + ≥
 + + −
  − +

= 
<
 + + − 


 
Where ( )0 2 1i i i iv кv к dδ = − + − . Similar to what mentioned above, we assume
( )outp i i iк pθ β δ− + < . And the optimal quantity *riQ  is expressed as follows: 
( )
( )
* 1
out
i i i pr
i out
i i i i
к p
Q F
к p s
δ β θ
δ β
−
 + + −
 =
 + + − 
 (22) 
The expected social value is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
*
* 0 2 2
0
0 2 *
V 1 1
1
r
iQr out out
i i i i i i i i i i i
out r
i i i i i i i i i i i
Q v кv к d s к p F x dx кv к d к p E x
v кv к d w t I w к p Q
β β
η β
   = − + − − + − + + − − − +   
 + − + − − + + + + + 
∫  (23) 
The expected profit of supplier is: 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
*
* *
* *
0
max ,0
][ ]( )
r
i
sr p r r out out r
i i i i i i i
Qp r r out out r
i i i i i i i
w c Q к x Q p t c
w c Q E x F x dx Q p t c
π = − + − − −
= − + + − − −∫
 (24) 
Proposition 10.  
(1) The relationship between the optimal quantities *iQ  and 
*r
iQ  is as follows: 
( )
( )
* * 2 1
* * 2 1(
( )
 )
r out
i i i i i i i i
r out
i i i i i i i i
Q Q p p t v v
Q Q p p t v v
if
if
β
β
< + − + < −
+ − + ≥ −

 ≥
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(2) when monitoring cost is relatively small, or in other words the quality of a certain relief 
material is easy to be monitored, outsourcing will possibly improve revenues of the 
third-party companies, the government and NPOs.  
(3) When monitoring cost is high, it seems impossible to improve the expected benefits of 
the supplier and purchaser simultaneously through outsourcing. 
Proof. See Appendix A 
6. Discussions and conclusions 
By a two-stage coordinated approach, this paper examines the optimal amount of 
proactive inventory for a certain relief item with and without outsourcing approach. 
We find that when and only when the difference between the proactive cost and the 
reactive cost is lower than the expected delay and shortage cost, the purchasers would 
choose to store relief supplies in advance, to enable a quick response; otherwise, it is 
much better to take reactive approach. In the basic model, the results show that the 
delay cost, shortage penalty cost, risk of supply shortage, salvage value, expected 
perishable rate, unit inventory cost and reactive price have significant impacts on the 
optimal amount of proactive inventory. 
In the case of proactive outsourcing strategy, social efficiency improvement 
mainly depends on the expected perishable rates and the monitoring costs. When the 
expected perishable rate is high or monitoring cost is low, the efficiency of relief 
supply chain can be improved through outsourcing. Otherwise, a better strategy for 
governments or NPOs is to take the insourcing approach.  
As for reactive outsourcing strategy, the monitoring cost has played an important 
role. When the monitoring cost is small, in other words, the quality of a certain relief 
commodity is easy to monitor, outsourcing can possibly improve the revenues of the 
third-party companies, the government or NPOs. However, when the monitoring cost 
is high, it seems impossible to improve the expected benefits of the supplier and the 
purchaser simultaneously. 
The analysis gives out several recommendations. First, the inventory strategies 
differ by types of relief commodities. The optimal pre-disaster order quantity of 
material inventory depends much on its expected perishable rate and other 
characteristics. Second, in some specific scenarios, the benefits of all members and 
the efficiency of relief supply chain can be simultaneously improved by outsourcing. 
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The third-party companies have the motivation to take part in the relief supply chain 
and therefore could play an important role to improve the efficiency of humanitarian 
relief. Finally, as for governments and NPOs, in terms of unperishable item the 
optimal response is to combine proactive outsourcing approach and reactive 
outsourcing strategy. In terms of imperishable item, the optimal response method is to 
choose proactive insourcing approach and reactive outsourcing strategy. In addition, 
the insourcing approach is much better for some materials whose monitoring cost is 
high. 
All in all, this paper compares the optimal prepositioned quantity of a certain 
good, with and without outsourcing and provides some insights about the relief 
material inventory system for the government or NPOs. There is still much room for 
further improvement, such as introducing option contract into the model. The 
combination of option contract and outsourcing would be an interesting topic for 
further research. 
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Appendix A 
Proof of proposition 9 
we assume that the unit revenue from re-purchasing and real-time purchasing of the 
supplier is same in the insourcing approach, namely p ri i i iw c p c− = − . Moreover, for 
better comparison, we assume out out outi i i i iw t I w ρ− − = + , where iρ  is a small number 
large than zero. This assumption matches the reality as the target of the private 
enterprises is to make profit. 
When ( )outi i i i i i iw w t EI wβ η+ > + + +   we can obtain: 
( )* 1 * 1outi r i i i r pp
i i
i r i i r i
к w к
Q F Q F
к s к s
γ θ β γ θ θ
γ θ γ θ
− −
 + − + + − 
 = < =   + − + −  
 
When ( )outi i i i i i iw w t EI wβ η+ ≤ + + + , we have: 
( )* 1 * 1outi r i i i r pp
i i
i r i i r i
к w к
Q F Q F
к s к s
γ θ β γ θ θ
γ θ γ θ
− −
 + − + + − 
 = ≥ =   + − + −  
 
It is hard to evaluate the relationship between ( )*V iQ  and ( )*V piQ  in this form 
directly. For better comparison, we let *pi iQ Q= , and thus the optimal social value 
without outsourcing is as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) [ ] ( ){ }
*
* 0 1 1
0
0 1 *
V 1 1
1 ( )
iQ
i i i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i i i i
Q v кv к d s к p t F x dx кv к d к p t E x
v кv к d w t I w к t QE pη
   = − + − − + − + + − − − +   
+ − + − − + + + + +
∫  
When *pi iQ Q= , the social value of proactive outsourcing strategy is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
*
0 1 1
0
0 1 *
V 1 1 ( )
1
iQp
i i i i i i i i i i i
out
i i i i i i i i
Q v кv к d s к p t F x dx кv к d к p t E x
v кv к d w к p t Qβ
   = − + − − + − + + − − − +   
 + − + − − + + + 
∫  
And we can obtain: 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ){ }1 * *V (V )p outi i i i i i i i i iV Q Q w t I w w QE η β∆ = − = + + + − +  
If the condition ( )outi i i i i i iw w t EI wβ η+ ≤ + + +  is met, we can easily get 1 0V∆ ≥ . 
Since it has been proved that *piQ  is the optimal stock quantity of solving the 
maximization problem of ( )E π piQ   , there is ( ) ( ) ( )* * *V V Vp pi i i iQ Q Q Q≥ = ≥ . 
Through the analysis, when iβ  is small enough or iη  is large enough, meaning 
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the condition ( )outi i i i i i iw w t EI wβ η+ ≤ + + +  could be satisfied, the social efficiency 
could be improved. Next, we will analyze the profit of the supplier under this situation. 
As ( )outi i i i i i iw w t EI wβ η+ ≤ + + + , it can easily obtain * *pi iQ Q≥ , The difference in 
supplier’s profit is: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
*
*
*
*
1 * *
0
* *
0
*
[ ](
]
)]
)(
p
i
i
p
i
i
Qs sp s p p p r
i i i i i i i
Qp r
i i i i i i
Qp r
i i i iQ
w c Q к E x F x dx Q p c
w c Q к E x F x dx Q p c
Q F x dx p c
π π π ρ
ρ
∆ = − = + − + + − −
 − − + − −  
=
−
+ −
∫
∫
∫
 
As iρ  and *piQ  is positive, additionally * *pi iQ Q≥  and ( ) 0ri ip c− > , the sign of 
1sπ∆  is positive. Therefore, the supplier also can get better. 
Proof of proposition 10 
Similarly, for better comparison, we assume out outi i i ip t p µ− = + , where iµ  is a 
small number large than zero, and p ri i i iw c p c− = − .  
Through comparison, the results show that When ( ) 2 1( )outi i i i i ip p t v vβ+ − + < − , we 
have the following relationship between *iQ  and *riQ . 
( )
( )
* 1 * 1
out
i i i p i r pr
i iout
i r ii i i i
к p к
Q F Q F
к sк p s
δ β θ γ θ θ
γ θδ β
− −
 + + − + − 
 = < =    + −+ + −   
 
If ( ) 2 1( )outi i i i i ip p t v vβ+ − + ≥ − , we have: 
( )
( )
* 1 * 1
out
i i i p i r pr
i iout
i r ii i i i
к p к
Q F Q F
к sк p s
δ β θ γ θ θ
γ θδ β
− −
 + + − + − 
 = ≥ =    + −+ + −   
 
In this case, it also hard to compare the relationship between ( )*V iQ  and 
( )*V riQ  directly. Similarly, we let *ri iQ Q= , and thus the social value with reactive 
outsourcing response is as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) [ ] ( ){ }
*
0 2 2
0
0 2 *(
V 1 1
)1
iQr out out
i i i i i i i i i i i
out
i i i i i i i i i i i
Q v кv к d s к p F x dx кv к d к p E x
v кv к d w t I w кE p Q
β β
η β
   = − + − − + − + + − − − +   
+ − + − − + + + + +
∫
And we get: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ] [ ( )2 * 2 1 *V V [( ) [ max ,0 ]r outi i i i i i i i iV Q Q к v v p p t E x Qβ∆ = − = − − + − + −  
As ( )*E[max ,0 0]ix Q− > , if ( ) 2 1( )outi i i i i ip p t v vβ+ − + < − , we will have 2 0V∆ > . 
Since it has been proved that *riQ  is the optimal stock quantity of solving the 
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maximization problem of ( )riE Qπ   , there is ( ) ( ) ( )* * *V V Vr ri i i iQ Q Q Q≥ = ≥ .  
Through the analysis, we find when the monitoring cost iβ  is small enough, the 
social efficiency could be improved, thus we just analyze the profit of the supplier 
under this situation. As ( ) 2 1( )outi i i i i ip p t v vβ+ − + < − , it can easily obtain * *ri iQ Q< , The 
difference in supplier’s profit is: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
*
*
* *
*
* *
*
0
*
2
0
*
0
[ )]](
]( )
[ ]
r
i
i
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i i
r
i
Qsr s p r r r
i i i i i i i
Qp r
i i i i i i
Q Qr
i i Q
s w c Q к E x F x dx Q p c
w c Q к E x F x dx Q p c
к E x F x dx Q к F x dx
π π π µ
µ
−
∆ = − = − + + − + −
 − − + − −  
= + − −
∫
∫
∫ ∫
 
As the relationship between ( ) ( )
*
*
0
[ ]
r
iQ r
i iк E x F x dx Q µ+ −∫  and ( )
*
*
i
r
i
Q
Q
к F x dx∫  is 
unclear. The sign of 2sπ∆  cannot be obtained according to the existing assumptions. 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Production 
Research on 19 July 2018, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/00207543.2018.1495853. 
 20 
References 
Nagurney, A., M. Yu, and Q. Qiang. 2011. “Supply chain network design for critical 
needs with outsourcing.” Papers in Regional Science, 90(1):123–142. 
Balcik, B., B. M. Beamon. 2008. “Facility location in humanitarian relief.” 
International Journal of Logistics, 11(2): 101-121. 
Barbarosoǧlu, G., and Y. Arda. 2004. A two-stage stochastic programming framework 
for transportation planning in disaster response. Journal of the Operational 
Research Society, 55(1):43-53. 
Beamon, B. M., and B. Balcik. 2008. “Performance measurement in humanitarian 
relief chains.” International Journal of Public Sector Management, 21(1): 4-25. 
Beamon, B. M., and S. A. Kotleba. 2006. “Inventory modelling for complex 
emergencies in humanitarian relief operations.” International Journal of Logistics: 
Research and Applications, 9(1): 1-18. 
Bottani, E., and A. Rizzi A. 2006. “A fuzzy TOPSIS methodology to support 
outsourcing of logistics services.” Supply Chain Management: An International 
Journal, 11(4): 294-308. 
Carbonnier, G. 2006. “Privatisation and outsourcing in wartime: the humanitarian 
challenges.” Disasters, 30(4): 402-416. 
Chakravarty A K. 2011. “A contingent plan for disaster response.” International 
Journal of Production Economics 134(1):3-15. 
Chakravarty, A. K. 2014. “Humanitarian relief chain: Rapid response under 
uncertainty.” International Journal of Production Economics 151: 146-157. 
Chavan M. 2017. “An appraisal of environment management systems: A competitive 
advantage for small businesses.” Management of Environmental Quality An 
International Journal 16(5):444-463. 
Cottam, H., M. Roe, and J. Challacombe. 2004. “Outsourcing of trucking activities by 
relief organisations.” Journal of Humanitarian Assistance 1(1). 
Cruzcantillo Y., and A. Saleh. 2014. “A System Dynamics Approach to Humanitarian 
Logistics and the Transportation of Relief Supplies.” International Journal of 
System Dynamics Applications 3(1):96-126. 
Da Costa, S. R. A., V. B. G. Campos, and R. A. de Mello Bandeira. 2012. “Supply 
chains in humanitarian operations: cases and analysis.” Procedia-Social and 
Behavioral Sciences 54: 598-607. 
Day, J. M., S. A. Melnyk, P. D. Larson, et al. 2012. “Humanitarian and disaster relief 
supply chains: a matter of life and death.” Journal of Supply Chain Management 
48(2): 21-36. 
Day, J. M. 2104. “Fostering emergent resilience: the complex adaptive supply 
network of disaster relief.” International Journal of Production Research 
52(7):1970-1988. 
Dolgui, A., D. Ivanov, and B. Sokolov. 2017. “Ripple effect in the supply chain: an 
analysis and recent literature.” International Journal of Production Research 
2017(3):1-17. 
Duran, S., and M. A. Gutierrez. 2011. “Keskinocak P. Pre-positioning of emergency 
items for CARE international.” Interfaces 41(3): 223-237. 
Gadde, L. E., and K. Hulthén. 2009. “Improving logistics outsourcing through 
increasing buyer–provider interaction.” Industrial Marketing Management 38(6): 
633-640. 
Gil, J. C. S., and S. Mcneil. 2015. “Supply Chain Outsourcing in Response to 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Production 
Research on 19 July 2018, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/00207543.2018.1495853. 
 21 
Manmade and Natural Disasters in Colombia, a Humanitarian Logistics 
Perspective.” Procedia Engineering 107(3):110-121. 
Grossman, G. M., and E. Helpman. 2005. “Outsourcing in a Global Economy.” 
Review of Economic Studies 72(1):135-159. 
Kovács, G., and K. M. Spens. 2007. “Humanitarian logistics in disaster relief 
operations.” International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics 
Management 37(2):99-114. 
Hansen, C., C. Mena, and H. Skipworth. 2016. “Exploring political risk in offshoring 
engagements.” International Journal of Production Research 55(7):2051-2067. 
Hsiao, H. I., R. G. M. Kemp, J.G.A.J. van der Vorst, et al. 2010. A classification of 
logistic outsourcing levels and their impact on service performance: Evidence from 
the food processing industry. International Journal of Production Economics 
124(1):75-86. 
Holguín-Veras, J., N. Pérez, S. Ukkusuri, et al. 2007. Emergency logistics issues 
affecting the response to Katrina: a synthesis and preliminary suggestions for 
improvement. Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation 
Research Board (2022): 76-82. 
Hong, J., A. T. H. Chin, and B. Liu. 2004. Logistics outsourcing by manufacturers in 
China: a survey of the industry. Transportation journal: 17-25. 
Horwitz, S. 2009. Wal-Mart to the rescue: private enterprise's response to Hurricane 
Katrina. The Independent Review 13(4): 511-528. 
Iakovou, E., D. Vlachos, C. Keramydas, et al. (2014). Dual sourcing for mitigating 
humanitarian supply chain disruptions. Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and 
Supply Chain Management 4(2): 245-264. 
Ivanov, D., B. Sokolov, and A. Dolgui. 2014. The Ripple effect in supply chains: 
trade-off ‘efficiency-flexibility-resilience’ in disruption management. International 
Journal of Production Research 52(7):2154-2172. 
Ivanov, D., B. Sokolov, I. Solovyeva, et al. 2016. Dynamic recovery policies for 
time-critical supply chains under conditions of ripple effect. International Journal 
of Production Research 54(23):7245-7258. 
König, A, S. Spinler. 2016. The effect of logistics outsourcing on the supply chain 
vulnerability of shippers: Development of a conceptual risk management 
framework. The International Journal of Logistics Management 27(1): 122-141. 
Kunz, N., G. Reiner, and S. Gold. 2014. Investing in disaster management capabilities 
versus pre-positioning inventory: a new approach to disaster preparedness. 
International Journal of Production Economics 157: 261-272. 
Lieb, R. C., and H. L. Randall. 1999. 1997 CEO Perspectives on the Current Status 
and Future Prospects of the Third Party Logistics Industry in the United States. 
Transportation Journal (American Society of Transportation & Log 38(3):28-41. 
Liang, L., X. Wang, and J. Gao. 2012. An option contract pricing model of relief 
material supply chain. Omega 40(5):594-600. 
Lin Moe, T., F. Gehbauer, S. Senitz, et al. 2007. Balanced scorecard for natural 
disaster management projects. Disaster Prevention and Management: An 
International Journal 16(5): 785-806. 
Lodree, E. J., K. N. Ballard, and C. H. Song. 2012. Pre-positioning hurricane supplies 
in a commercial supply chain. Socio-Economic Planning Sciences 46(4), 291-305. 
Manopiniwes, W., and T. Irohara. 2016. Stochastic optimisation model for integrated 
decisions on relief supply chains: preparedness for disaster response. International 
Journal of Production Research 55(4), 979-996. 
Nagurney, A., M. Yu, and Q. Qiang. 2011. Supply chain network design for critical 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Production 
Research on 19 July 2018, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/00207543.2018.1495853. 
 22 
needs with outsourcing. Papers in Regional Science 90(1): 123-142. 
Naor, M., A. Dey, S. M. Goldstein, et al. 2017. Civilian-military pooling of health care 
resources in Haiti: a theory of complementarities perspective. International Journal 
of Production Research (2):1-17. 
Ransikarbum, K., and S. J. Mason. 2014. Multiple-objective analysis of integrated 
relief supply and network restoration in humanitarian logistics operations. 
International Journal of Production Research (1):49-68. 
Razzaque, M. A., and C. C. Sheng. 1998. Outsourcing of logistics functions: a 
literature survey. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics 
Management 28(2):89-107. 
Rezaei-Malek, M., R. Tavakkoli-Moghaddam, B. Zahiri, et al. 2016. An interactive 
approach for designing a robust disaster relief logistics network with perishable 
commodities. Computers & Industrial Engineering 94:201-215. 
Sohail, M. S., and A. S. Sohal. 2003. The use of third party logistics services: a 
Malaysian perspective. Technovation 23(5):401-408. 
Thomas, A. S., and L. R. Kopczak. 2005. From logistics to supply chain management: 
the path forward in the humanitarian sector. Fritz Institute 15: 1-15. 
UNISDR. 2016. United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction. Comparing 
present to past. Retrieved on February 29, 
2016.http://www.unisdr.org/files/47804_2015disastertrendsinfographic.pdf. 
Wang, X., F. Li, L. Liang, et al. 2015. Pre-purchasing with option contract and 
coordination in a relief supply chain. International Journal of Production 
Economics 167: 170-176. 
Wang, X., and Z. Huang. 2014. Outsourcing logistic service to a private enterprise in a 
relief supply chain. International Conference on Service Systems and Service 
Management IEEE:1-5. 
Wang, X., Y. Wu, L. Liang, et al. 2016. Service outsourcing and disaster response 
methods in a relief supply chain. Annals of Operations Research 240(2):471-487. 
Wei, S. L. 2000. A lemon market? An incentive scheme to induce truth-telling in third 
party logistics providers. European Journal of Operational Research 
125(3):519-525. 
Yadavalli ,V. S. S., D. K. Sundar, S. Udayabaskaran. 2015. Two substitutable 
perishable product disaster inventory systems. Annals of Operations Research 
233(1):517-534. 
Yang, F., Q. Yuan, S. Du, et al. 2014. Reserving relief supplies for earthquake: a 
multi-attribute decision making of China Red Cross. Annals of Operations Research 
1-27. 
Yang, Q., X. Zhao, H. Y. J. Yeung, et al. 2016. Improving logistics outsourcing 
performance through transactional and relational mechanisms under transaction 
uncertainties: Evidence from China, International Journal of Production 
Economics 175: 12-23. 
